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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Defendant-Appellant Salvatore Stabile (―Stabile‖) 
pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1344, waived a jury trial and stipulated to facts for a 
bench trial with regard to three counts of receipt of child 
pornography and one count of possession of child 
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).  The 
District Court found Stabile guilty of these child pornography 
charges.  Stabile retained the right to appeal the District 
Court‘s ruling on his suppression motions.  All charges were 
consolidated for sentencing, and the District Court sentenced 
Stabile to concurrent sentences of 78 months‘ imprisonment 
on each count.  Stabile appeals the District Court‘s denial of 
his motion to suppress as well as the sentence the District 
Court imposed.   
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The facts in this case are complex and they relate to a 
number of issues.  In particular we face issues regarding the 
scope of the plain view doctrine in the context of computer 
searches.  We will affirm the District Court‘s suppression 
order.  Stabile also appeals his sentence, however we decline 
to exercise our jurisdiction over the sentencing appeal 
because Stabile waived his right to appeal his sentence.  
  
I. Facts 
A. Background 
Prior to the beginning of the investigation, Stabile 
resided in Mahwah, New Jersey, with Debbie Deetz.  Deetz 
believed that she was married to Stabile.  However, Stabile 
was already married and had not divorced his first wife.  
Appx. at A-453.  The house shared by Stabile and Deetz was 
secured by a mortgage and home equity credit line in the 
name of Stabile‘s brother.  Stabile defaulted on these loans 
and tried to mask his default by passing more than $156,000 
in counterfeit checks.  These counterfeit checks initially 
formed the basis for investigating Stabile. 
 
B. Search of Stabile’s House 
 At 1:00 p.m. on July 24, 2006, Secret Service Special 
Agents Christopher Albanese and John Croes, and Detective 
Joseph Nieciecki of the Bergen County Sheriff‘s Department, 
arrived at Stabile‘s house to question Stabile about 
counterfeiting checks.  Stabile was not at home, but Deetz 
answered the door, invited the agents inside, asked the 
officers to sit at a table near the living room, and offered them 
something to drink.  The officers informed Deetz of the 
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purpose of their visit and explained that they suspected that 
Stabile had engaged in financial crimes.  Albanese then asked 
Deetz for consent to search the house.  Albanese provided 
Deetz with a consent form and informed Deetz that she could 
refuse consent.  Deetz reviewed the consent form for 
approximately thirty minutes and then signed it.  Deetz 
testified that one of the reasons she voluntarily signed the 
form was so she herself could find out about Stabile‘s 
deceptive financial practices. 
 
Deetz granted consent orally and in writing by signing 
a consent form.
1
  Without a search warrant but with Deetz‘s 
                                              
1
 The ―Consent To Search‖ form states, in its entirety: 
 
―I, Debbie Deetz, have been informed of my 
constitutional right not to have a search made of 
the premises and/or automobile mentioned 
without a search warrant.  I have also been 
informed of my right to refuse to consent to 
such a search.  However, I hereby authorize 
Christopher Albanese and John Croes, Special 
Agents, United States Secret Service to conduct 
a complete search of the premises and/or 
automobile at 181 Miller Road, Mahwah, NJ.  
These (officers or agents) are authorized by me 
to take from the premises and/or automobile 
any letters, papers, materials or other property 
which is contraband or evidence in the nature of 
financial crimes.  I understand that this 
contraband or evidence may be used against me 
in a court of law.  This written permission is 
being given by me to the above named persons 
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consent, the agents began a search of the house.  During the 
course of the search, Deetz led the agents around the house, 
provided the agents with documents related to Stabile‘s 
finances, and showed the agents the locations of several 
computers.  Next to one computer, the agents found check 
stock, check writing software, photocopies of checks, copies 
of previously-passed fraudulent checks, two printers, and 
checks with an alias.  Deetz also showed the agents two 
computers and several hard drives in the basement of the 
house.  At the suppression hearing, Deetz testified:  
 
Q. And who pointed out those hard drives to the law 
enforcement officers?  
A. I [Deetz] did.  
Q. Did you provide consent for the officers to search 
those computers?  
A. Yes, I did.  
 
Appx. at A-467.  The agents then called the Bergen County 
Prosecutor‘s Office, which sent two members from its 
Computer Crimes Unit to disconnect the hard drives.  Deetz 
showed the recently-arrived Bergen County officers the 
locations of the computers and the hard drives.  Deetz 
watched the officers remove the hard drives.  When one 
officer had difficulty removing a hard drive, Deetz asked the 
officer if he needed a screwdriver.  The officer replied that he 
                                                                                                     
voluntarily and without threats, duress, or 
promises of any kind.  I understand that I may 
ask for and receive a receipt of all things taken.‖ 
 
    The form was then signed by Albanese, Croes, and Deetz.  
Appx. at A-195. 
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did, so Deetz got a screwdriver from Stabile‘s toolbox and 
gave it to the officer.  At approximately 6:00 p.m., the Bergen 
County officers Justified the house, taking with them six hard 
drives.  Stabile was not present in his house at any point 
during this search.  In fact, the search had been completed 
when Stabile arrived home, at approximately 7:15 p.m.   
 
 During their search of Stabile‘s house, the agents also 
found several DVDs in a desk bearing labels which led the 
agents to believe the DVDs contained child pornography.
2
  
The officers seized the DVDs but, upon a later viewing of 
their contents, determined that they did not contain child 
pornography. 
 
 When Stabile arrived home, Deetz waited outside the 
house while the agents interviewed Stabile.  Although the 
agents attempted to question Stabile, Stabile refused to 
answer questions without an attorney present.  When 
informed that Deetz had already consented to the search, 
Stabile attempted to revoke Deetz‘s consent by stating ―I take 
it back.‖  The agents then departed.  It is undisputed that 
Stabile did not request the return of his property at this time.  
In fact, Stabile did not request return of his seized property 
until February 15, 2008, when he filed a motion to return 
property.   
 
                                              
2
 One such DVD was labeled ―Japanese Mature Women VS. 
Ripe Boy Movies.‖  Agent Albanese also opined in his 
affidavit attached to the warrant application that the ―images 
of males depicted on the labels are . . . images of minors.‖  
Appx. at A-127-28. 
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C. Issuance of the State Search Warrant 
 Although the agents obtained the six hard drives on 
July 24, 2006, Agent Albanese did not apply for a state search 
warrant until October 19, 2006 because he was assigned to a 
Secret Service security detail for the President and other high 
officials.  Finally, Albanese applied for a state search warrant 
on October 19, 2006 in New Jersey Superior Court in Morris 
County.
3
  The state search warrant was issued and authorized 
search of the computer hard drives
4
 for evidence of ―both 
financial crimes and the possession of child pornography.‖  
Probable cause to search the hard drives for evidence of 
financial crimes was based on the check stock, printed 
checks, and check printing software found in Stabile‘s house.  
                                              
3
 Stabile‘s home was in Bergen County, New Jersey, but the 
investigation was centered in Morris County, New Jersey, 
where Stabile allegedly delivered three counterfeit checks to 
an attorney. 
 
4
 The Morris County Inventory Receipt identified six hard 
drives: 
 
(1) Western Digital 40 GB 3.5 inch HDD, Ser # 
WMAAT1253959 
(1) Western Digital 120 GB 3.5 inch HDD, Ser # 
WMAAT2323593 
(1) Western Digital 2559.8 MB 3.5 inch HDD, Ser # 
WM3491805359 
(1) Seagate 3.5 inch HDD, Ser # LAA62086 
(1) Quantum 3.5 inch HDD, Ser # 824909331341 
(1) Samsung 6.8 GB 3.5 inch HDD, Ser # 
0149J1FKB07213  
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Probable cause to search for evidence of child pornography 
was based on the DVDs found in a desk in Stabile‘s house.  
The affidavit submitted by Albanese stated that ―This Affiant 
believes these DVDs contain labels with language that refers 
to mature women and young boys and contains images of 
minors.‖  Unbeknownst to Albanese, between the July 24, 
2006 seizure of the DVDs and the October 19, 2006 state 
search warrant application, state law enforcement officers had 
already viewed the DVDs and determined that they did not 
contain child pornography.  Albanese was not aware that the 
DVDs had been viewed and determined not to contain child 
pornography when he applied for the state search warrant on 
October 19, 2006.  Accordingly, the state search warrant 
obtained on October 19, 2006 stated that it authorized search 
of the hard drives for evidence of both financial crimes and 
child pornography.  
    
 On November 16, 2006, after the issuance of the state 
search warrant, Agent Albanese traveled to the Bergen 
County Prosecutor‘s Office where the evidence was stored.  
Albanese picked up the evidence and transported it to the 
Morris County Prosecutor‘s Office.  During this process, but 
before Albanese brought the hard drives to the Morris County 
Prosecutor‘s Office, Albanese learned that the DVDs from the 
desk had been viewed and were found not to contain child 
pornography.  Appx. at A-726.  Upon arrival, Albanese 
―informed everybody,‖ including the detective who would 
perform the forensic search, that there was a ―problem‖ with 
the state search warrant as it related to child pornography.  
Appx. at A-726.  
 
D. Execution of State Search Warrant 
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In mid-November, 2006, Detective Vanadia, a forensic 
specialist at the Computer Crimes Unit of the Morris County 
Prosecutor‘s Office, received the hard drives.  Vanadia had 
been instructed to search only for evidence of financial crimes 
and told that if he came across child pornography, he was to 
stop his review and contact the Secret Service.  Appx. at A-
528, A-562, A-580-81, A-727-28.   
 
 With these instructions, Detective Vanadia 
commenced his forensic hard drive search.  He began with the 
120 GB hard drive (Western Digital 120 GB 3.5 inch HDD, 
Ser # WMAAT2323593).  During this search, Vanadia noted 
numerous suspicious folders.  One such folder was entitled 
―Kazvid.‖  Vanadia understood this folder to reference 
―Kazaa,‖ a peer-to-peer file sharing program used to share 
music, movies, pictures, and programs.  Appx. at A-532.  
Vanadia also testified that, in his experience, Kazaa has been 
used to share and distribute child pornography. 
 
Detective Vanadia then ―highlighted‖ the Kazvid 
folder, a procedure that allowed him to view a list of file 
names contained in the folder.  Vanadia later testified that he 
highlighted the Kazvid folder not because it necessarily 
contained child pornography but because – as a suspicious 
folder – it could harbor evidence of any sort of crime, 
including a financial crime.  Appx. at A-536-37, A-581-82.  
Vanadia also testified that, in his experience, people hoping to 
conceal the contents of a folder or file would often mislabel 
or otherwise disguise those folders or files.  Appx. at A-537, 
A-582.  However, Vanadia did acknowledge that when he 
viewed the file names in the ―Kazvid‖ folder, the thought that 
it may contain child pornography did cross his mind.  Appx. at 
A-588.   
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After highlighting the ―Kazvid‖ folder, Detective 
Vanadia observed a list of file names with file extensions 
indicating video files and file names suggestive of child 
pornography.
5
  At this point, although Vanadia admitted that 
he suspected child pornography and did not believe these 
video files contained evidence of financial crimes, Vanadia 
proceeded to open twelve different video files within the 
Kazvid folder.  Appx. at A-534-35, A-591-92.  Vanadia 
testified that he opened these twelve files to ―confirm‖ that 
they contained child pornography rather than something else 
(such as adult pornography).  Appx. at A-534-35, A-591-92.  
After ―confirming‖ that these files did contain child 
pornography, Vanadia contacted the prosecutor, who 
instructed Vanadia to cease his review of the hard drive.  
Agent Albanese was notified of Vanadia‘s findings.  
  
E. The Federal Search Warrants 
 After learning of Detective Vanadia‘s discovery of 
child pornography, Agent Albanese applied for a federal 
search warrant on April 23, 2007, which was issued on April 
24, 2007.  This was the first federal search warrant issued in 
this case.  The affidavit for the first federal search warrant 
was based on probable cause gleaned from the names of the 
files in the Kazvid folder, not the contents of the files 
                                              
5
 These files had names such as ―PTHC‖ (pre-teen hardcore), 
―PEDO‖ (pedophile-related), ―6YO‖ (six-year-old), and 
―8YO‖ (eight-year-old).  Some file names identified a sex act 
and the gender of the participant following the ―YO‖ age 
designation. 
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themselves.
6
  At no point in the first federal search warrant 
application did the affidavit state that Vanadia had opened the 
files in the Kazvid folder. 
 
On April 24, 2007, based on the file names found in 
the Kazvid folder on the 120 GB drive, a magistrate issued 
the first federal search warrant authorizing further 
investigation.  However, by mistake the first federal search 
warrant only authorized the search of a different hard drive 
owned by Stabile, the 40 GB hard drive (Western Digital 40 
GB 3.5 inch HDD, Ser # WMAAT1253959), rather than the 
120 GB hard drive Detective Vanadia had examined.  
  
 Around April 25, 2007, Agent Joseph Tokash executed 
the first federal search warrant and searched the 40 GB hard 
                                              
6
 The affidavit stated:  
 
26. While running a search for the counterfeit check 
numbers, Detective Vanadia began reviewing the file 
folders on the DRIVE to locate a commercially 
available check processing program which, based upon 
his training and expertise, he knew was commonly 
used in the production of counterfeit checks.  While 
conducting this review, Detective Vanadia observed a 
file folder labeled ―Kazaa Vid‖ that contained 
approximately 410 saved files.  Detective Vanadia 
further observed that several of these files contained 
titles with the abbreviation ―PTHC‖ as well as file 
names including ―6yopedo‖ and ―9yofuck.‖ 
 
Appx. at A-164. 
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drive.  This search resulted in the discovery of two videos and 
86 thumbnail images of child pornography.  Appx. at A-189. 
 
 Based on the discovery of child pornography on the 40 
GB hard drive, Agent Albanese sought a second federal 
search warrant on September 20, 2007 to search the other five 
hard drives (including the 120 GB hard drive originally 
searched by Detective Vanadia in November, 2006 pursuant 
to the state search warrant for financial information).  The  
second federal search warrant was issued authorizing the 
search of the remaining five hard drives (excluding the 
previously-searched 40 GB hard drive).  Agent Tokash 
executed the second federal search warrant and discovered 
more than 200 videos and 100 thumbnail images depicting 
child pornography. 
 
F. Arrest and Prosecution 
 On October 10, 2007, Stabile was arrested and charged 
with receipt of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2252A(a)(2)(B) and indicted on February 21, 2008.  On 
February 2, 2009, a superseding indictment was filed 
charging Stabile with three counts of receipt of child 
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) and 
one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). In a separate prosecution, on 
May 9, 2008, Stabile was charged with bank fraud under 18 
U.S.C. § 1344.   
 
G. Stabile’s Motion to Suppress and the District Court’s 
Decision 
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 On July 1, 2008, Stabile moved to suppress evidence 
seized from his house on July 24, 2006, arguing (1) that the 
Government‘s warrantless seizure of the hard drives for three 
months without a search warrant was unreasonable, and (2) 
that pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the 
state search warrant authorizing search for child pornography 
was invalid because the DVDs from the desk which formed 
the alleged ―probable cause‖ did not actually contain child 
pornography.   
 
 In September, 2008, the District Court held a two-day 
evidentiary hearing.  On November 3, 2008, the parties 
submitted post-hearing briefs.  Stabile argued that: (1) 
Detective Vanadia‘s search exceeded the scope of the search 
for financial information authorized by Deetz‘s consent and 
the state search warrant; (2) Stabile withdrew Deetz‘s consent 
when he got home and therefore, pursuant to Georgia v. 
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), the Government waited an 
unreasonable period of time to secure the state search 
warrant; and (3) suppression of evidence was required as a 
result of this unreasonable search.  On December 4, 2008, the 
District Court again heard oral argument. 
 
 On January 21, 2009, the District Court denied 
Stabile‘s motion to suppress.  United States v. Stabile, Crim. 
No. 08-145 (SRC), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4263 (D.N.J. Jan. 
21, 2009).  The District Court concluded that the search of 
Stabile‘s house was a valid consent search, that Stabile could 
not ―revoke‖ Deetz‘s prior consent under Georgia v. 
Randolph, that the Government‘s delay in obtaining a state 
search warrant was not unreasonably long, and that, under the 
inevitable discovery doctrine, the evidence obtained from the 
search of the 120 GB hard drive need not be suppressed. 
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 On February 3, 2009, Stabile filed a motion for 
reconsideration in which he argued that, inter alia, the 
District Court committed legal error by applying the 
inevitable discovery doctrine rather than the independent 
source doctrine, and that this error required correction.  On 
March 13, 2009, the District Court denied the motion for 
reconsideration, reaffirming its application of the inevitable 
discovery doctrine and holding that the evidence would also 
be admissible under the independent source doctrine.  United 
States v. Stabile, Crim. No. 08-145 (SRC), 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20275 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2009).   
 
H. Stipulated Facts Trial and Guilty Verdict (Child 
Pornography Counts) 
 
 Following denial of his motion to reconsider, Stabile 
executed stipulations with the Government, including an 
admission that he knowingly received and possessed child 
pornography.  Stabile also executed a stipulation preserving 
his right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.  The 
parties also stipulated that the applicable Guidelines offense 
level was 26.  Finally, Stabile stipulated that he ―voluntarily 
waives the right to file any appeal . . . including but not 
limited to an appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 . . . which 
challenges the sentence imposed by the sentencing court in 
this case if that sentence falls within or below the Guidelines 
range that results from the agreed total Guidelines offense 
level of 26.‖   
 
 On April 3, 2009, Stabile was advised in court about 
the impact of the stipulations, including the appellate waiver.  
Stabile knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the stipulations.  
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After a bench trial, the District Court found Stabile guilty of 
all four counts in the Superseding Indictment pertaining to 
child pornography. 
 
I. Guilty Plea (Bank Fraud Count) 
 On April 3, 2009, Stabile was charged in a one-count 
information with bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, 
executed a written Plea Agreement, and entered a guilty plea 
to the information. 
 
J. Consolidated Sentencing Proceeding 
All of Stabile‘s convictions were consolidated for 
sentencing.  A sentencing hearing was held on August 12, 
2009.  The District Court calculated the applicable Guidelines 
range using offense level 26 – the level to which Stabile had 
agreed.   Stabile‘s criminal history category was level III.  
The District Court determined that Stabile‘s Guidelines range 
was 78 to 97 months.  The District Court also heard 
arguments from Stabile that the child pornography guideline, 
specifically U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, should be afforded little 
deference.  After considering these arguments and the 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the District Court imposed 
concurrent 78-month sentences on each count. 
 
K. Appeal 
 On August 21, 2009, Stabile filed an appeal 
challenging the District Court‘s denial of his motion to 
suppress and his sentence.  
 
II. Jurisdiction 
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 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction over Stabile‘s appeal of the 
District Court‘s denial of his motion to suppress under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and over his challenge to his sentence under 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a).  
 
III. Issues and Analysis 
 On appeal, Stabile challenges the District Court‘s 
denial of his motion to suppress as well as the sentence the 
District Court imposed. 
 
III.A. Motion to Suppress  
 Stabile first appeals the District Court‘s denial of his 
motion to suppress evidence of child pornography obtained 
from Stabile‘s six computer hard drives.  Stabile alleges 
myriad violations of his Fourth Amendment rights and 
concludes that the fruits of these allegedly illegal searches 
must be suppressed.  We consider Stabile‘s arguments in 
chronological order of the investigation: (1) search of 
Stabile‘s house; (2) seizure of Stabile‘s six computer hard 
drives; (3) delay in obtaining the state search warrant; and (4) 
search of the hard drives.  Finding no Fourth Amendment 
violations requiring suppression, we will affirm. 
 
We review the District Court‘s denial of a motion to 
suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual 
determinations but exercise plenary review over the District 
Court‘s application of law to those facts.  See United States v. 
Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002).   
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III.A.1. Search of Stabile’s House 
 Stabile first argues that the Government‘s July 24, 
2006 warrantless search of his house violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  This argument fails because Deetz consented to 
the search.   
 
 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 
177, 183 (1990); United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 277 
(3d Cir. 2009); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 
(1980).  In general, a ―warrantless entry into a person‘s house 
is unreasonable per se.‖  See Payton, 445 U.S. at 586.  
However, there are exceptions to this rule.  See Jones v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). 
 
 Consent is an exception to the ―requirements of both a 
warrant and probable cause.‖  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 219 (1973); see Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 
250-51 (1991) (approving consent searches because a search 
permitted by consent is reasonable).  Consent must be given 
voluntarily, Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 
(1968), and voluntariness may be gleaned from considering a 
range of factors.  See Price, 558 F.3d at 279; United States v. 
Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 955 (3d Cir. 1994).  The individual giving 
consent must also possess the authority to do so, see 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, and ―the consent of one who 
possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid 
as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that 
authority is shared,‖ United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 
170 (1974).  Common authority rests not on property rights 
but ―rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally 
having joint access or control . . . so that it is reasonable to 
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recognize that any of the cohabitants has the right to permit 
the inspection in his own right and that the others have 
assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the 
common area to be searched.‖  Id. at 172 n.7.  Finally, ―a 
warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the 
express refusal of consent by a physically present resident 
cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of 
consent given to the police by another resident.‖  Georgia v. 
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006). 
 
Here, Deetz had authority to consent and voluntarily 
consented.  Deetz had common authority to consent to a 
search of the house because, as a cohabitant, she mutually 
used the property along with Stabile and exercised joint 
access and control over the house.  See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 
172 n.7.  Deetz‘s mistaken belief that she was married to 
Stabile does not alter the analysis because an unmarried 
cohabitant has authority to consent to a search of shared 
premises.  See id. at 176.  Finally, we note that at the time 
Deetz granted consent, Stabile was not present.  Stabile‘s 
absence distinguishes this case from Georgia v. Randolph, 
which applies only when a ―physically present resident‖ 
refuses consent.  547 U.S. at 120.  Therefore, because Deetz 
exercised her access and control over the premises absent any 
contemporaneous refusal by a co-resident, she had authority 
to consent at the time of the search.      
 
We also conclude that Deetz‘s consent was voluntary.  
―[W]e determine the voluntariness of a consent by examining 
the totality of the circumstances.‖  Price, 558 F.3d at 278; 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.  We consider such factors as 
―age, education, and intelligence of the subject; whether the 
subject was advised of his or her constitutional rights; the 
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length of the encounter, the repetition or duration of the 
questioning; and the use of physical punishment.‖  Price, 558 
F.3d at 278; see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.  The ―‗setting 
in which the consent was obtained [and] the parties‘ verbal 
and non-verbal actions‘‖ are also relevant.  Price, 558 F.3d at 
278 (quoting United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 459 (3d 
Cir. 2003)).  Finally, even though Deetz was told she could 
refuse, the Government need not inform the subject of his 
right to refuse consent.  Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (not 
essential for prosecution to show that the consenter knew of 
the right to refuse consent in order to establish that the 
consent was voluntary); Kim, 27 F.3d at 955.   
 
Here, Deetz, an educated person, invited the officers 
into her house.  She asked the officers to sit and offered them 
drinks.  The officers asked Deetz to sign a written consent 
form, and Deetz thought about whether to sign it for thirty 
minutes before she did, in fact, sign it.  Deetz also orally 
consented to the search.  After signing the form, Deetz 
assisted the officers in their search of the house by leading 
them to several computers and, later, providing one officer 
with a screwdriver to help remove a hard drive.  Considering 
the totality of the circumstances, there is no indication that 
Deetz‘s consent was involuntary.   
 
Therefore, because Deetz had the authority to consent 
to a search of the house and because Deetz voluntarily 
consented to the search, the initial warrantless search of the 
house did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
 
III.A.2. Seizure of Stabile’s Six Hard Drives 
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 Although Stabile concedes in his brief that the 
warrantless seizure of the six computer hard drives is 
controlled by the case law
7
 of this circuit, he nevertheless 
contests the seizure and makes two arguments in his brief.  
First, Stabile contends that the Government lacked authority 
to seize the six hard drives because Deetz could not consent 
to a seizure of the drives.  Second, Stabile argues that even if 
Deetz did validly consent to the seizure of the hard drives, the 
Government‘s seizure was still unreasonably overbroad.  
Both of these arguments lack merit. 
 
III.A.2.a. Consent to Seize Hard Drives 
We first consider whether Deetz consented to the 
seizure of the hard drives.  This analysis parallels the analysis 
of whether Deetz could consent to the search of the house: 
Deetz must have had authority to consent to the seizure of the 
hard drives, and she must have consented voluntarily.   
 
We believe Deetz had authority to consent to the 
seizure of the six hard drives.  The ―authority to consent‖ 
determination is complicated because computers often 
contain segregated blocks of information.  We begin with the 
same proposition that authority to consent derives from 
―mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint 
access or control for most purposes.‖  Matlock, 415 U.S. at 
171 n.7; see Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (joint 
use of duffel bag gave third party authority to consent to 
search of bag).  However, a third party lacks authority to 
consent to a search of an area in which the target of the search 
                                              
7
 Stabile cites United States v. King, 604 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
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has not ―relinquished his privacy.‖  United States v. King, 604 
F.3d 125, 137 (3d Cir. 2010); see United States v. Block, 590 
F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that mother had authority to 
consent to search of son‘s bedroom but not to son‘s locked 
footlocker kept under his bed); Randolph, 547 U.S. at 135 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (―To the extent a person wants to 
ensure that his possessions will be subject to a consent search 
only due to his own consent, he is free to place these items in 
an area over which others do not share access and control, be 
it in a private room or a locked suitcase under a bed.‖).  Thus 
if a person has not ―relinquished his privacy‖ in some files on 
a computer or in a subset of information contained on the 
computer, a third party would have no authority to consent to 
the search or seizure of those segregated materials.    
  
Additionally, multiple people may use the same 
computer and store information on the same hard drive.  It is 
more difficult to determine whether joint access and control 
exists over information stored on a computer than the 
contents of a duffel bag.  See Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740.  
Indeed, attempting to make these determinations would force 
courts to engage in the very ―metaphysical subtleties‖ the 
Supreme Court expressly rejected in Frazier when the 
defendant unsuccessfully argued that a third party had ―actual 
consent‖ only to use one compartment of a duffel bag.  Id.  
Thus we are faced at the outset with a conceptual question: is 
a computer more like a shared duffel bag, see Frazier, 394 
U.S. 731, or more like a locked footlocker under the bed?  See 
Block, 590 F.2d 535.  We believe the answer depends on 
factors such as the identity of the user(s), whether password 
protection is used, and the location of the computer in the 
house.  See United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711,718-20 
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(10th Cir. 2007) (listing factors to consider when evaluating 
validity of third party consent to search computer).   
 
Recently, in United States v. King, where the 
defendant ―placed his hard drive inside the computer‖ owned 
by another person but which the two of them shared, and did 
not use password protection, the defendant ―assumed the risk‖ 
that the other person would ―consent to its seizure.‖  604 F.3d 
at 137.  Conversely, in Trulock v. Freeh, the defendant 
utilized password protection to protect his private computer 
files, and, therefore, the Fourth Circuit determined that the 
defendant had not assumed the risk that his co-user ―would 
permit others to search his files.‖  275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 
2001).  Moreover, in King, we considered whether the 
holding of Georgia v. Randolph that a ―present and objecting 
resident can override another resident‘s consent to search a 
home‖ applied to the seizure of a computer.  604 F.3d at 130.  
The King court determined that Randolph was meant to apply 
only to dwellings and, therefore, that a ―present and objecting 
resident‖ could not override another resident‘s consent to 
seize a shared computer which contained a personal hard 
drive but lacked user-specific password protection.  Id. at 
137; see Andrus, 483 F.3d at 721 (objectively reasonable to 
perceive third party consent where consenter was a ―user‖ of 
the computer).   
 
Here, the facts weigh in favor of a determination that 
Deetz had the authority to consent to a search and seizure of 
the shared hard drives.  First, the computer was not password-
protected.  The failure to use password protection indicates 
that Stabile relinquished his privacy in the contents of the 
computer.  Cf. Trulock, 275 F.3d at 403 (third party did not 
have authority to consent to search of joint computer user‘s 
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password-protected files).  In distinction to King, here Stabile 
was not present and objecting to the search of the computer.  
Moreover, all of the computers and seized hard drives were 
located in common areas of the home, such as on the main 
floor and in the basement, rather than in a private bedroom.  
See Andrus, 483 F.3d at 719 (third party authority to consent 
generally upheld when computer located in common area 
accessible to family members).  These factors indicate that, 
under the totality of the circumstances, Deetz had unfettered 
access to the hard drives and had authority to consent to the 
seizure of all of them.  
 
 Deetz‘s consent to the seizure of the six hard drives 
was voluntary.  As previously discussed, Deetz signed the 
consent form and told the investigator to ―go ahead and take 
them [the hard drives].‖  Moreover, Deetz‘s consent may also 
be inferred from the assistance she provided to the officers.  
Specifically, when one officer had difficulty extracting a hard 
drive from the computer terminal, Deetz obtained a 
screwdriver from Stabile‘s toolbox and gave it to the officer.  
See United States v. Al-Marri, 230 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (defendant objectively consented to search 
of his computer by, inter alia, assisting the investigation by 
helping FBI agents pack his computer in a carrying case).  
 
 Thus we conclude that Deetz had authority to consent 
to the seizure of the six hard drives and did so voluntarily. 
 
III.A.2.b. Scope of Seizure of Hard Drives 
 Pursuant to Deetz‘s consent, the officers searched the 
house and seized six computer hard drives.  Stabile argues 
that even assuming Deetz validly consented to this search and 
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seizure, the seizure of six entire hard drives was unreasonable 
because it was unconstitutionally overbroad.  Stabile notes 
that by seizing six entire hard drives, the Government also 
seized personal emails and other information not related to 
financial crimes.  Therefore, according to Stabile, the 
Government‘s failure to ―segregate‖ data on-site (at Stabile‘s 
house) renders this seizure unconstitutionally overbroad.  The 
Government defends the seizure on the grounds that Deetz 
did not limit the scope of her consent, that evidence of 
financial crimes could be found anywhere on any computer 
hard drive, and that the practical considerations of 
investigating and seizing electronic evidence counsel against 
on-site data collection.  We agree with the Government and 
reject Stabile‘s argument.  
 
The seizure of the six entire hard drives was 
reasonable.  First, except for the restriction as to financial 
crimes, Deetz did not limit the scope of her consent in any 
way.  See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251-52 (requiring explicit 
limitation on consent).  Second, a broad seizure was required 
because evidence of financial crimes could have been found 
in any location on any of the six hard drives, and this 
evidence very likely would have been disguised or concealed 
somewhere on the hard drive.  See United States v. Adjani, 
452 F.3d 1140, 1150 (9th Cir. 2006).  Third, as a practical 
matter, ―[w]hen a search requires review of a large collection 
of items, such as papers, ‗it is certain that some innocuous 
documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to 
determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers 
authorized to be seized.‘‖  United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 
511, 519-20 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Andresen v. Maryland, 
427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976)).  Finally, Stabile argues for an 
―on-site‖ search requirement, but the practical realities of 
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computer investigations preclude on-site searches.  For 
example, a hard drive search requires a ―controlled 
environment.‖  United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 637 (9th 
Cir. 2000).  Computer searches are also time consuming and 
require trained forensic investigators.  See United States v. 
Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999).  In short, such on-
site searches would be ―fraught with difficulty and risk,‖ 
United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2006), and 
cannot be rushed by a cursory on-site search.
8
  All these 
reasons suggest that the seizure of the six entire hard drives 
was reasonable.   
   
Lastly, although Stabile attempted to revoke Deetz‘s 
consent when he returned home later on the day of the search 
                                              
8
 Stabile heavily relies on United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 
591 (9th Cir. 1982).  His reliance is faulty.  Tamura, a case 
dealing with the overbroad seizure of paper records, 
―preceded the dawn of the information age.‖  Comprehensive 
Drug Testing, 621 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(discussing Tamura).  And even the Ninth Circuit recognized 
that Tamura needed to be ―updated . . . to apply to the 
daunting realities of electronic searches.‖  Id. at 1177.  Thus 
while the concerns of Tamura may remain valid, we hesitate 
to apply the procedures Tamura outlined for proper searches 
of physical evidence to the procedures required to searches of 
electronic evidence.  See generally, id., at 1175-78.  Finally, 
we note that although the Tamura court found the overbroad 
seizure of documents ―unreasonable,‖ the court concluded 
that suppression was not required.  Tamura, 694 F.2d at 696-
97.  Thus, even if Tamura were to apply, it would not require 
suppression here either. 
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by stating ―I take it [Deetz‘s consent] back‖ to the 
investigating agents, this revocation is ineffective.  Stabile 
could not revoke Deetz‘s consent to search the house because 
Stabile was not ―physically present‖ at the time Deetz 
consented.  Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120.  Nor can Stabile 
revoke Deetz‘s consent to the seizure of the shared hard 
drives because Stabile had ―relinquished his privacy‖ in the 
hard drives, King, 604 F.3d at 137, and thus ―assumed the 
risk‖ that a third party could consent to their search or 
seizure, Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171.  
    
III.A.3. Delay in Obtaining the State Search Warrant 
 Stabile also argues that the Government unreasonably 
delayed by waiting almost three months
9
 before obtaining the 
state search warrant and searching the seized hard drives.  
This argument raises some difficult issues.     
 
 Initially, we note that Stabile‘s reliance on United 
States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2009), and United 
States v. Dass, 849 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1988), is misplaced.  
Mitchell and Dass held, respectively, that a 21-day delay and 
a 7- to 23-day delay between seizure and search were 
unreasonable when the warrantless seizures were based on 
probable cause, not consent.  Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1349-51; 
Dass, 849 F.2d at 414-15.  This distinction matters.  The 
Mitchell court carefully policed the temporal delay in 
obtaining a search warrant because each passing day 
―infringes possessory interests protected by the Fourth 
                                              
9
 The officers seized the hard drives on July 24, 2006, but the 
state search warrant was not issued until October 19, 2006.   
 
27 
 
Amendment‘s prohibition on ‗unreasonable searches.‘‖  
Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1350 (quoting United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984)).  But where a person 
consents to search and seizure, no possessory interest has 
been infringed because valid consent, by definition, requires 
voluntary tender of property.
10
 
 
 Of course, ―a seizure lawful at its inception can 
nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of 
execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment‘s prohibition on 
‗unreasonable seizures.‘‖  Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125.  To 
determine whether the seizure became unreasonable, this 
Court ―must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on 
the individual‘s Fourth Amendment interests against the 
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the 
intrusion.‖  United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); 
see United States v. Martin, 157 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(―even a seizure based on probable cause is unconstitutional if 
police act with unreasonable delay in securing a warrant‖).  
  
Here, we balance the interests at stake to determine 
whether the three month delay was reasonable.  Stabile relies 
on Mitchell‘s focus on the property interest at stake in one‘s 
computer: 
 
Computers are relied upon heavily for personal 
and business use.  Individuals may store 
personal letters, e-mails, financial information, 
                                              
10
 As noted, there was no request for return of the hard drives 
until February 15, 2008, which was well after the state search 
warrant had been obtained. 
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passwords, family photos, and countless other 
items of a personal nature in electronic form on 
their computer hard drives. . . . If anything, this 
consideration applies with even greater force to 
the hard drive of a computer, which is the 
digital equivalent of its owner‘s home, capable 
of holding a universe of private information. 
     
Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1351-52.  Stabile also argues that ―his 
job required him to have constant access to a computer.‖  
Appx. at A-202; Appellant‘s Br. 23.  
  
Stabile‘s actions undermine his argument.  First, it is 
undisputed that Stabile did not ask for the return of his hard 
drives until February 15, 2008 – eighteen months after the 
initial seizure of the hard drives.
11
  See United States v. Johns, 
469 U.S. 478, 487 (1985) (defendants who ―never sought 
return of the property‖ cannot argue that delay adversely 
affected Fourth Amendment rights).  And when asked why he 
never requested the return of the hard drives, Stabile testified, 
―I just assumed that perhaps that they didn‘t find anything 
and it was going to go away.‖  Appx. at A-780.  Second, 
                                              
11
 Stabile argues that his attempted revocation of Deetz‘s 
consent must be construed as a ―request for re-possession of 
his seized property.  Appellant‘s Br. 26.  We disagree.  In 
response to the officers‘ statement to Stabile that Deetz had 
already given consent to a search of the house, Stabile 
replied, ―I take it back.‖  This bare statement cannot be 
transformed into a request for return of the hard drives.  
Moreover, Stabile concedes, as he must, that our opinion in 
United States v. King forecloses his attempt to revoke consent 
pursuant to Georgia v. Randolph.  Appellant‘s Br. 35 n.16.   
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although Stabile claims he needed a computer for work, 
Deetz brought a replacement computer to the house one day 
after Stabile‘s computers had been seized.  Appx. at A-473-
75.  
    
We also consider the Government‘s rationale for the 
delay.  Agent Albanese testified that the three-month delay in 
securing a state search warrant was due to his assignment to a 
Secret Service Detail protecting the President and other high 
officials. Moreover, because Albanese was the lead case 
agent, he was responsible for seeking the state search warrant.  
Stabile notes that the Eleventh Circuit in Mitchell rejected the 
argument that a 21-day delay was not unreasonable because 
the officer was attending a training seminar.  Mitchell, 565 
F.3d at 1352.  However, the Mitchell court explicitly stated 
that ―we emphasize that we are applying a rule of 
reasonableness that is dependent on all of the circumstances.‖  
Id.  Moreover, the Mitchell court stated that it would be 
―sympathetic‖ if ―some overriding circumstances arose, 
necessitating the diversion of law enforcement personnel to 
another case.‖  Id. at 1353.  Here, such overriding 
circumstances were present because Agent Albanese was 
assigned to what was obviously important security work.  
Agent Albanese was also the lead investigator on a multiple-
county investigation requiring coordination.  Considering this 
explanation along with the other factors, we believe the 
Government‘s three-month delay in obtaining a state search 
warrant was reasonable under the circumstances.  
Nevertheless, the delay was not unavoidable, and we are 
troubled by it.  In the absence of the same circumstances 
present here, we might very well reach a different result. 
      
III.A.4. Execution of State Search Warrant 
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 As previously discussed, Agent Albanese obtained the 
state search warrant on October 19, 2006.  In mid-November, 
Detective Vanadia commenced a warranted search of the 120 
GB hard drive solely for evidence of financial crimes.
12
  
During this search, Vanadia noticed a folder named ―Kazvid.‖  
The folder contained files bearing names indicative of child 
pornography.  Vanadia then opened these files and 
―confirmed‖ that they did contain child pornography.  Stabile 
argued that this search violated the Fourth Amendment and 
that the fruits of the search had to be suppressed.   
 
The District Court first determined that Detective 
Vanadia lawfully opened the Kazvid folder.  The District 
Court then found that the file names of the files in the Kazvid 
folder were in ―plain view,‖ but that the plain view doctrine 
did not encompass the contents of those files.  However, the 
District Court determined that Vanadia‘s decision to view the 
contents of the files, although violative of the Fourth 
Amendment, did not require suppression because of the 
inevitable discovery doctrine. 
      
On appeal, Stabile challenges each step of this search, 
arguing that: (1) Detective Vanadia improperly opened the 
                                              
12
 The warrant initially authorized a search for evidence of 
both financial crimes and child pornography.  However, 
because probable cause was based on DVDs found in 
Stabile‘s desk that did not actually contain child pornography, 
the District Court determined that the child pornography 
section of the warrant had to be excised in violation of Franks 
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).  United States v. Stabile, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4263, at *20-*21 (D.N.J. Jan. 21, 
2009).  The parties do not dispute this decision.   
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―Kazvid‖ folder; (2) that the plain view doctrine should not 
apply to the file names found in the Kazvid folder; and (3) 
that the inevitable discovery and independent source doctrines 
do not apply and therefore this evidence must be suppressed.  
The Government contends that the plain view doctrine applies 
not only to the names of the files in the Kazvid folder but also 
to all the contents of those files.  For the reasons that follow, 
we determine that Detective Vanadia properly opened that 
Kazvid folder; that the names of the files in that folder were 
in plain view; and that although under the facts of this case 
the plain view doctrine may not apply to the contents of those 
files, the independent source and inevitable discovery 
doctrines apply to the contents of the files, thereby removing 
any need for suppression.  Therefore, we will affirm the 
District Court‘s decision.  
 
III.A.4.a. View of Files in “Kazvid” Folder 
The first issue is whether, pursuant to the state search 
warrant to search for evidence of financial crimes, Detective 
Vanadia properly viewed the files in the Kazvid folder.  The 
District Court found that Vanadia properly opened this file 
because he reasonably believed that it could contain evidence 
of financial crimes. 
  
Stabile contends that Detective Vanadia ―stumbled‖ 
upon the videos in the Kazvid folder by failing to limit the 
scope of his search to evidence of financial crimes.  
Appellant‘s Br. 29.  According to Stabile, Vanadia‘s decision 
to open Kazvid was an unreasonably overbroad search, not 
limited to evidence of financial crimes, and a pretext for 
searching for child pornography.  See Appellant‘s Br. 29-30, 
37 n.19.  We disagree. 
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Resolution of this issue forces us to reconcile two 
competing principles.  On one hand, it is clear that because 
criminals can – and often do – hide, mislabel, or manipulate 
files to conceal criminal activity, a broad, expansive search of 
the hard drive may be required.  See United States v. Burgess, 
576 F.3d 1078, 1092-94 (10th Cir. 2009) (―[T]here may be no 
practical substitute for actually looking in many (perhaps all) 
folders and sometimes at the documents contained within 
those folders, and that is true whether the search is of 
computer files or physical files.‖); United States v. Mann, 592 
F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2010) (relevant files are often hidden 
and can be mislabeled and ―manipulated to hide their true 
contents‖); Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1150 (9th Cir. 2006).  On 
the other hand, as Stabile argues, granting the Government a 
carte blanche to search every file on the hard drive 
impermissibly transforms a ―limited search into a general 
one.‖  Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) 
(―The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe 
things to be seized makes general searches under them 
impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a 
warrant describing another.‖); see United States v. Tracey, 
597 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2010).  To reconcile these 
competing aims, many courts have suggested various 
strategies and search methodologies to limit the scope of the 
search.  
    
In United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 
the federal government investigated the Bay Area Lab 
Cooperative (―Balco‖), suspected of providing steroids to 
professional baseball players.  621 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9
th
 Cir. 
2010).  In 2002, the Major League Baseball Players 
Association entered into a collective bargaining agreement 
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that provided for drug testing of all players (performed by 
Comprehensive Drug Testing) for the purpose of determining 
only whether more than five percent of players tested 
positive.  Id.  The players were assured that the results would 
remain anonymous and confidential.  Id.  During the Balco 
investigation, the government learned of ten players who had 
tested positive, and it sought and obtained a warrant limited to 
the records of ten players as to whom there was probable 
cause to search.  Id.  However, when the government 
executed the warrant, the government seized and reviewed the 
drug testing record for hundreds of players.  Id.  On appeal to 
the Ninth Circuit en banc, the en banc court discussed proper 
procedures for handling seized data premised on its earlier 
opinion in Tamura.  Id. At 1167.  For example, the initial 
review and segregation of the data was to be performed not 
by the case agents but by ―law enforcement personnel trained 
in search and seizing computer data.‖  Id. At 1168.  The 
government was to return any data that did not fall within the 
scope of the warrant.  Id. At 1168-69.  As the Ninth Circuit 
stated: 
 
We recognize the reality that over-seizing is an 
inherent part of the electronic search process 
and proceed on the assumption that, when it 
comes to the seizure of electronic records, this 
will be far more common than in the days of 
paper records.  This calls for greater vigilance 
on the part of judicial officers in striking the 
right balance between the government‘s interest 
in law enforcement and the right of individuals 
to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  The process of segregating electronic 
data that is seizable from that which is not must 
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not become a vehicle for the government to gain 
access to data which it has no probable cause to 
collect.   
 
Id. At 1177. 
In United States v. Carey, the Tenth Circuit suggested 
methods to avoid searching files of the type not identified in 
the warrant, such as ―observing files types and titles listed on 
the directory, doing a key word search for relevant terms, or 
reading portions of each file stored in the memory.‖  172 F.3d 
1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 1999).  The Tenth Circuit has refined 
its approach since Carey.  In Burgess, the Tenth Circuit 
considered the appropriate standards for searching a hard 
drive, offering the following guidance: ―while officers must 
be clear as what it is they are seeking on the computer and 
conduct the search in a way that avoids searching files of 
types not identified in the warrant,‖ United States v. Walser, 
275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001), ―a computer search may 
be as extensive as reasonably required to locate the items 
described in the warrant‖ based on probable cause.  United 
States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263, 1270 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(quotations omitted).  But the search warrant itself need not 
―contain a particularized computer search strategy.‖  United 
States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir. 2005).  
Given that it would be ―folly for a search warrant to structure 
the mechanics of the search‖ because ―imposing such limits 
would unduly restrict legitimate search objectives,‖ Burgess, 
576 F.3d at 1094, the scope of the search must be 
―constrained by content.‖  Id. at 1093.  In Burgess, that 
content was computer files containing evidence of drug use or 
trafficking.  Id.  To avoid transforming a limited search into a 
general one, the court cautioned that ―[a]s the description of 
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such places and things becomes more general, the method by 
which the search is executed become[s] more important – the 
search method must be tailored to meet allowed ends.‖  Id. at 
1094.  Speaking directly to search methodology, Burgess 
recommended that computer searches begin by using search 
protocol to structure the search with an analysis of the file 
structure, followed by a search for suspicious file folders, and 
then looking for files and types of files most likely to contain 
the objects of the search by doing keyword searches.  Id.  In 
the end, however, the Burgess court noted that ―there may be 
no practical substitute for actually looking in many (perhaps 
all) folders and sometimes at the documents contained within 
those folders . . . .‖  Id.   
 
Finally, in United States v. Mann, the defendant argued 
that the government‘s search of his computer for evidence of 
voyeurism exceeded the scope of the search warrant where 
the search produced evidence of child pornography.  592 F.3d 
at 781.  The Seventh Circuit held that the search was lawful, 
and noted the particular difficulties in attempting to locate 
image files on a computer because the files may be 
―manipulated to hide their true contents.‖  Id. at 782; see Hill, 
459 F.3d at 978 (―Images can be hidden in all manner of files, 
even word processing documents and spreadsheets.  
Criminals will do all they can to conceal contraband, 
including the simple expedient of changing the names and 
extensions of files to disguise their content from the casual 
observer.‖).  
 
Turning to the instant case, the scope of the consent 
and state search warrant were limited to evidence of financial 
crimes.  For a number of reasons, we believe that Detective 
Vanadia‘s decision to highlight and view the contents of the 
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Kazvid folder was reasonable and permissible under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
 
First, Detective Vanadia‘s decision to highlight and 
view the contents of the Kazvid folder was objectively 
reasonable because criminals can easily alter file names and 
file extensions to conceal contraband.  See Williams, 592 F.3d 
at 522; Hill, 459 F.3d at 978.  Second, Detective Vanadia‘s 
search procedures complied with the search procedures 
outlined in Carey – a case which advocates more restrictive 
search procedures than the broader search procedures 
approved in Williams and Burgess.  For example, Carey 
suggested search methods such as focusing on the file type 
identified in the warrant, file names, key word search, and 
directory structure.  172 F.3d at 1276.  Conversely, Williams 
stated that a computer search authorized at least a ―cursory 
review of each file on the computer.‖  592 F.3d at 522.  
Likewise, Burgess suggested that ―there may be no practical 
substitute for actually looking in many (perhaps all) folders 
and sometimes at the documents contained within those 
folders‖ while conducting an electronic search.  576 F.3d at 
1094.  Here, Vanadia took steps to ensure that his 
investigation complied with the state search warrant.  Vanadia 
began by physically inspecting the hard drive and creating a 
copy of the drive to ensure that the original drive was not 
damaged or corrupted during the search.  Next, Vanadia 
examined the file signatures to see if any files had been 
corrupted.  He then conducted a ―hash value analysis‖ to see 
if any files had been copied.  Finally, he examined suspicious 
and out-of-place folders, such as the Kazvid folder.  Appx. at 
A-521-27, A-531-32, A-536-37.  These procedures 
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demonstrate that Vanadia engaged in a  focused search of the 
hard drives rather than a general search.
13
 
 
Finally, Stabile argues that Detective Vanadia 
exceeded the scope of the state search warrant because 
Vanadia testified that he knew that there may have been child 
pornography contained in the Kazvid folder.
14
  This argument 
                                              
13
 We note that although Stabile argues that Detective 
Vanadia‘s search methodology was overbroad, Stabile offers 
no practical alternative methodology that would have 
protected his interests yet still permitted a thorough search for 
evidence of financial crimes.  See Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1095; 
Brooks, 427 F.3d at 1251.  Indeed, Stabile‘s only suggestion 
was for Vanadia to use EnCase software to conduct a ―green 
home plate highlighting of the entire hard drive,‖ which 
would have permitted Vanadia to isolate file types.  
Appellant‘s Br. 28.  But because evidence of check fraud is 
often contained on image files, if Vanadia had employed 
Stabile‘s suggested method, he still would have isolated 
image files and, eventually, Vanadia would have discovered 
images of child pornography.  Therefore, Stabile fails to 
propose a legitimate alternative methodology. 
 
14
 Stabile quoted the following testimony in support of his 
argument: 
 
Q. At the moment that you were making the decision 
to open up Kazvid, didn‘t you say to yourself, you 
know, there may well be child pornography here? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Okay.  So it‘s not true that you opened the folder 
only for the purpose of trying to see whether or not 
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fails because an investigator‘s subjective intent is not relevant 
to whether a search falls within the scope of a search warrant.  
See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (―the scope 
of a lawful search is defined by the object of the search and 
the places in which there is probable cause to believe it may 
be found‖) (internal citation omitted); Williams, 592 F.3d at 
524 (where investigators executed search warrant for 
evidence of computer harassment on defendant‘s hard drive, 
plain view seizure of child pornography discovered during 
search was permissible ―even if finding child pornography 
was their hope from the outset‖).15  Here, the state search 
warrant objectively authorized Vanadia to search for evidence 
of financial crimes, and Vanadia‘s testimony that he 
subjectively believed the Kazvid folder could harbor evidence 
of child pornography does not render the search of the Kazvid 
folder invalid.  Moreover, as Vanadia made clear in his 
testimony, the Kazvid folder required further investigation 
because evidence of financial crimes could be hidden within.  
Appx. at A-536-37. 
                                                                                                     
there were financial crimes or evidence of financial 
crimes lurking in the Kazvid directory.  Isn‘t that fair 
to say? 
A. Yes. 
 
Appx. at A-42. 
 
15
 See also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) 
(―The fact that an officer is interested in an item of evidence 
and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not 
invalidate its seizure if the search is confined in an area and 
duration by the terms of a warrant or a valid exception to the 
warrant requirement.‖).   
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For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
highlighting the Kazvid folder was reasonable and did not 
exceed the scope of the state search warrant.  
 
III.A.4.b. Plain View Examination of File Names 
 After highlighting the Kazvid folder, Detective 
Vanadia observed in the folder a list of files with lurid names.  
The Government argues that these file names may be 
examined pursuant to the plain view doctrine.  Stabile 
disagrees.  This brings us to the question of whether evidence 
of other crimes in a computer can be examined under the 
plain view doctrine.  We hold that the plain view doctrine 
applies to seizures of evidence during searches of computer 
files, but the exact confines of the doctrine will vary from 
case to case in a common-sense, fact-intensive manner.
16
  
                                              
16
 We decline to follow the Ninth Circuit‘s suggestion to 
―forswear reliance on the plain view doctrine‖ whenever the 
government seeks a warrant to examine a computer hard 
drive.  United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 
F.3d 1162, 1178 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).  
Instead, we agree with the Seventh Circuit‘s view that rather 
than jettisoning the plain view doctrine entirely in electronic 
searches, ―the more considered approach ‗would be to allow 
the contours of the plain view doctrine to develop 
incrementally through the normal course of fact-based 
adjudication.‘‖  Mann, 592 F.3d at 785 (quoting 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1184 (Callahan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part from the en banc 
panel‘s per curiam opinion)).  In short, we agree that ―[a] 
measured approach based on the facts of a particular case is 
40 
 
What is permissible in one situation may not always be 
permissible in another.  
  
There are three requirements for valid seizures of 
evidence in plain view.  ―First, the officer must not have 
violated the Fourth Amendment in ‗arriving at the place from 
which the evidence could be plainly viewed.‘  Second, the 
incriminating character of the evidence must be ‗immediately 
apparent.‘  Third, the officer must have ‗a lawful right of 
access to the object itself.‘‖  United States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 
550, 559-60 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Horton, 496 U.S. at 141) 
(internal citations omitted).  Detective Vanadia‘s examination 
of the file names in the Kazvid folder, to the extent that he 
may arguably be said to have ―seized‖ the names by, for 
example, making a screen print, satisfies all three plain view 
requirements.
17
 
                                                                                                     
especially warranted in the case of computer-related 
technology, which is constantly and quickly evolving.‖  
Comprehensive Drug Testing, 621 F.3d at 1184 (Callahan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part from the en banc 
panel‘s per curiam opinion).  We engage in just such a fact-
intensive inquiry here. 
 
17
 Mere observation must be distinguished from seizure, a 
distinction that may become hazy in the digital environment.  
We do not believe that simply seeing the file names 
constitutes a seizure.  See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 
n.4 (1983) (plurality opinion) (―It is important to distinguish 
‗plain view,‘ . . . to justify seizure of an object, from an 
officer‘s mere observation of an item left in plain view.  
Whereas the latter generally involves no Fourth Amendment 
search . . . , the former generally does implicate the 
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 First, Detective Vanadia did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment in arriving at the place from which the evidence 
could be viewed.  Deetz consented to the seizure of all six 
hard drives and a magistrate issued a state search warrant to 
search all six hard drives for evidence of financial crimes.  
Vanadia began executing the state search warrant by 
searching the 120 GB hard drive.  Within the 120 GB hard 
drive, Vanadia noticed the Kazvid folder.  He lawfully 
highlighted the Kazvid folder to view its contents because a 
thorough computer search requires a broad examination of 
files on the computer to ensure that file names have not been 
manipulated to conceal their contents.  See Williams, 592 
F.3d at 522; Hill, 459 F.3d at 978.  Nor did Vanadia 
unreasonably expand the scope of his search by highlighting 
the Kazvid folder and viewing its contents.  See Mann, 592 
F.3d at 784 (search was lawful where investigator conducted 
search within scope of warrant and did not knowingly expand 
the scope of the search to discover child pornography).  
Therefore, the first plain view requirement is satisfied 
because Vanadia ―lawfully arrived at the point from which 
the evidence could be viewed.‖   
                                                                                                     
Amendment‘s limitations upon seizures of personal property.  
The information obtained as a result of observation of an 
object in plain sight may be the basis for probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.  In turn, these levels 
of suspicion may, in some cases, . . . justify police conduct 
affording them access to a particular item.‖) (internal citations 
omitted).  Whether recording the names in some fashion 
implicates the Fourth Amendment is not something we need 
to decide in this case.  We will assume that it does, solely for 
the sake of analyzing why Stabile‘s arguments fail. 
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Second, there is no doubt that the incriminating 
character of the evidence—in this instance the names 
themselves—was ―immediately apparent.‖18  The Kazvid 
folder contained files with lurid names.  These file names 
suggested that Stabile illegally possessed contraband (child 
pornography).  See Williams, 592 F.3d at 522 (―[W]hen the 
officer then comes upon child pornography, it becomes 
‗immediately apparent‘ that its possession by the computer‘s 
owner is illegal and incriminating.‖). 
   
Third, Detective Vanadia had a ―lawful right of 
access‖ to the object of the search because he was authorized 
by a state search warrant to search the 120 GB hard drive for 
evidence of Stabile‘s financial crimes.  See id.   
 
 Therefore, we conclude that the Government properly 
examined the file names listed in the Kazvid folder pursuant 
to the plain view doctrine.  
 
III.A.4.c. Plain View Examination of File Contents 
 After highlighting the Kazvid folder, Detective 
Vanadia viewed a list of file names with file extensions 
suggesting child pornography videos.  Vanadia testified that 
                                              
18
 Again, it is only because the file names themselves have 
evidentiary significance and may at least arguably be ―seized‖ 
via, for example, a screen print, and then tendered in 
evidence, that the plain view doctrine could be implicated at 
all.  See Brown, 460 U.S. at 739 n.4 (distinguishing ―plain 
view‖ as a doctrine that justifies the seizure of evidence from 
the mere observation of things in plain sight). 
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he opened these video files to ―confirm‖ they contained child 
pornography.  Appx. at A-534-35, A-591-92.  The 
Government claims in their brief that under the plain view 
doctrine, once Detective Vanadia saw the lurid file names he 
was then empowered to seize and examine the contents of 
those files.  Gov‘t‘s Br. 38.  Stabile argues, and the District 
Court concluded, that opening the video files to view their 
contents exceeded the scope of the state search warrant and 
that plain view did not apply, resulting in an illegal search.
19
  
The state search warrant issued on October 19, 2006 
authorized Vanadia to search all six hard drives only for 
evidence of financial crimes.
20
   
 
We need not resolve whether the plain view doctrine 
applies to examination of contents of the video files because 
the independent source and inevitable discovery doctrines 
apply to the contents of all the video files.  Therefore, we 
ultimately conclude that suppression is not required.  
  
III.A.4.d. Independent Source 
                                              
19
 The District Court concluded, however, that this violation 
did not require suppression because the inevitable discovery 
doctrine applied. 
 
20
 The warrant also authorized a search for child pornography 
in the DVDs found in a desk in Stabile‘s home.  These DVDs 
did not contain child pornography, and the District Court 
ultimately excised this portion of the warrant because it ran 
afoul of Franks v. Delaware.  Appx. at A-101.   
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Even assuming Detective Vanadia illegally opened and 
examined the contents of the video files in the Kazvid folder, 
the independent source doctrine applies and removes any taint 
from this search.
21
  Typically, the exclusionary rule requires 
that we suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal 
search.  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963).  
However, ―[t]he independent source doctrine serves as an 
exception to the exclusionary rule and permits the 
introduction of ‗evidence initially discovered during, or as a 
consequence of, an unlawful search, but later obtained 
independently from activities untainted by the initial 
illegality.‘‖  United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 281 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 
537 (1988)).  Here, the District Court concluded that 
suppression was not required because the inevitable discovery 
exception to the exclusionary rule applied.
22
  For the reasons 
                                              
21
 For purposes of applying the independent source doctrine, 
we assume, without deciding, that Vanadia illegally viewed 
the contents of the video files in the Kazvid folder.   
 
22
 Following the District Court‘s January 21, 2009 order 
denying his motion to suppress, Stabile filed a motion to 
reconsider, arguing that the District Court erred by applying 
the inevitable discovery doctrine rather than the independent 
source doctrine.  On March 13, 2009, the District Court 
denied Stabile‘s motion to reconsider and reaffirmed its 
reliance on the inevitable discovery doctrine.  The District 
Court concluded that suppression was unnecessary under the 
independent source doctrine as well.   
Here, we think the independent source doctrine more 
appropriately applies to the contents of the video files.  We 
also think that the inevitable discovery doctrine applies to the 
45 
 
                                                                                                     
evidence obtained while executing the invalid first and 
second federal warrants, which were obtained subsequently.   
The Third Circuit contrasted these doctrines in United 
States v. Herrold: 
 
[U]nder the independent source doctrine, 
evidence that was in fact discovered lawfully, 
and not as a direct or indirect result of illegal 
activity, is admissible.  In contrast, the 
inevitable discovery doctrine, applied in Nix, 
permits the introduction of evidence that 
inevitably would have been discovered through 
lawful means, although the search that actually 
led to the discovery of the evidence was 
unlawful.  The independent source and 
inevitable discovery doctrines thus differ in that 
the former focuses on what actually happened 
and the latter considers what would have 
happened in the absence of the initial search. 
 
962 F.2d 1131, 1140 (3d Cir. 1992).  Here, pursuant to the 
state search warrant, Vanadia lawfully discovered evidence of 
child pornography (lurid file names and the first video file) 
while searching for evidence of financial crimes.  Although 
Vanadia may have exceeded the scope of the state search 
warrant by expanding the search and opening  the contents of 
the video files, the initial inspection and resulting discovery 
were lawful.  Accordingly, the independent source doctrine 
applies.  In contrast, and for reasons we will discuss, the 
inevitable discovery doctrine applies to the ensuing unlawful 
searches made pursuant to the two federal search warrants.  
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that follow, we conclude that the independent source doctrine 
applies to the results of the search executed pursuant to the 
state search warrant and vitiates any need to suppress 
evidence of child pornography.   
 
Assuming that Detective Vanadia illegally viewed the 
contents of the videos in the Kazvid folder, we ask whether 
this illegal search is so intertwined with the eventual 
acquisition of child pornography from Stabile‘s hard drives 
that this evidence must be suppressed.  We ask: ―(1) whether 
a neutral justice would have issued the search warrant even if 
not presented with information that had been obtained during 
an unlawful search and (2) whether the first search [the search 
of the contents of the eleven video files] prompted the 
officers to obtain the [subsequent] search warrant.‖  Herrold, 
962 F.2d 1131, 1144 (3d Cir. 1992); see Price, 558 F.3d at 
282.  ―If the answers to these questions are yes and no 
respectively . . . then the evidence seized during the warranted 
search, even if already discovered in the original entry, is 
admissible.‖  Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1144.  
  
The answer to the first question is ―yes.‖  After 
Detective Vanadia executed the state search warrant, Agent 
Albanese applied for the first federal search warrant.  The 
application for the first federal search warrant cited, as 
probable cause, the lurid file names Vanadia observed in 
plain view during his search of the 120 GB hard drive.  The 
application also cited Vanadia‘s experience that files bearing 
such names may contain child pornography.  Importantly, the 
warrant application did not mention that Vanadia had viewed 
                                                                                                     
These subsequent searches were unlawful for lack of probable 
cause. 
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the contents of any of the video files.
23
  Even assuming that 
Vanadia illegally viewed the video files‘ contents, the results 
of that search did not taint the warrant application Albanese 
presented to the magistrate.  See Price, 558 F.3d at 282 
(applying independent source doctrine where warrant was still 
supported by probable cause even after excising illegally-
obtained information).  After considering the warrant 
application, the magistrate issued the first federal search 
warrant.  Therefore, the answer to the first inquiry under the 
independent source doctrine is clearly yes because a neutral 
magistrate did, in fact, issue the first federal search warrant.  
           
The answer to the second question is ―no.‖  The 
contents of the video files, which we presume Detective 
Vanadia viewed illegally, did not prompt Agent Albanese to 
apply for the first federal search warrant.  In Price, police 
arrested the defendant after he sold methamphetamine to an 
undercover police officer.  558 F.3d at 273.  A search incident 
to the arrest ―revealed items indicative of methamphetamine 
trafficking.‖  Id.  The police then went to the defendant‘s 
home, where they asked for, and received, consent to search 
the home from the defendant‘s wife.  Id. at 274.  After 
searching the home, the police attempted to obtain consent to 
search the locked basement, but the defendant‘s wife said she 
did not have a key.  Id. at 275.  The officer picked the lock on 
the basement door, entered the basement, and observed items 
used to manufacture methamphetamine.  Id.  Later that day, 
police applied for and obtained a search warrant, returned to 
the home, and seized the chemicals related to 
methamphetamine manufacture from the basement.  Id.  The 
defendant moved to suppress the items seized from the 
                                              
23
 The full text of the affidavit is contained in footnote 6. 
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basement on the grounds that the police lacked valid consent 
to enter the basement, and the district court denied the 
relevant portion of the motion.  Id. at 276.  On appeal, we 
held that regardless of the validity of the wife‘s consent, the 
items seized from the basement were admissible under the 
independent source doctrine.  Id. at 280.  First, the illegally 
observed evidence did not prompt the officers to apply for the 
search warrant.  Id. at 282.  Second, the search warrant 
contained sufficient probable cause from independent sources 
even though the affidavit in support of the warrant application 
referenced the items illegally discovered in the basement.  Id.  
Even without this evidence, given the history of the 
investigation, such as the facts that the defendant had 
incriminating paraphernalia on his person at the time of arrest 
and that paraphernalia was found in his home, it seemed 
―impossible that the police would not have applied for a 
warrant to search the basement of the house . . . .‖  Id. at 282; 
see also Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1140-41 (―It is inconceivable 
that the police would have Justified the premises without 
searching the trailer and without arresting [the defendant] 
since they had information that Herrold, who was known to 
them as a drug dealer with a record of convictions for violent 
crimes, had obtained a large quantity of cocaine some of 
which he sold to the informant.‖).  Therefore, the Price court 
invoked the independent source doctrine and affirmed the 
district court‘s suppression order.   
 
Here, there are even more compelling reasons to vitiate 
the taint of the presumed illegal search than existed in Price.  
In Price, the search warrant application referenced the 
illegally observed evidence, but here, as previously 
mentioned, the warrant application made no mention of the 
contents of the Kazvid video files.  This distinction supports 
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our determination that if the contents of the remaining video 
files were illegally viewed, they did not prompt Agent 
Albanese to seek the first federal search warrant.  Moreover, 
as in Price, here the police legally discovered ample 
additional evidence.  While executing the state search 
warrant, Detective Vanadia lawfully viewed lurid file names 
indicative of child pornography.  In light of this evidence, it 
would be ―impossible‖ or ―inconceivable‖ that Albanese 
would not have applied for the first federal warrant.  See 
Price, 558 F.3d at 282; Herrold, 962 F.2d at 1140.  The 
answer to the second question in the independent source 
inquiry – i.e., whether the results of the illegal search 
prompted officers to obtain a subsequent search warrant – is 
―no‖ because the lurid file names prompted Albanese to seek 
the first federal search warrant.  Therefore, the independent 
source doctrine applies, and there would be no reason to 
suppress the contents of the videos.  
 
III.A.4.e. Inevitable Discovery 
The independent source doctrine removes the taint of 
any illegality from the initial search of the contents of the 
Kazvid folder in the 120 GB hard drive.  However, the 
subsequent searches of the 120 GB hard drive and ultimately 
all the hard drives were illegal because these searches were 
not supported by valid warrants.  As previously discussed, the 
first federal search warrant was invalid because it mistakenly 
authorized a search of the 40 GB hard drive rather than the 
120 GB hard drive.  The second federal search warrant was 
invalid because it relied on evidence obtained from the 
unlawful search of the 40 GB hard drive.  Despite this 
illegality, the inevitable discovery doctrine applies, rendering 
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suppression of the evidence gathered as a result of these 
illegal searches unnecessary. 
 
Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, ―if the 
prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been 
discovered by lawful means . . . then the deterrence rationale 
has so little basis that the evidence should be received.‖  
United States v. Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.3d 192, 195 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)).  
The Government can meet its burden by establishing ―that the 
police, following routine procedures, would inevitably have 
uncovered the evidence.‖  Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.3d at 
195.  The inevitable discovery analysis focuses on ―historical 
facts capable of ready verification, not speculation.‖  Id.; see 
Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5.  
  
 As the District Court concluded, the Government has 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that routine police 
procedures inevitably would have led to the discovered child 
pornography.  Although the first federal search warrant 
mistakenly called for searching the 40 GB hard drive rather 
than the 120 GB hard drive, the file names in the Kazvid 
folder Detective Vanadia opened still continued to provide 
probable cause to obtain a valid warrant to search the 120 GB 
hard drive.  A lawful search of the 120 GB hard drive would 
have led to the videos of child pornography in the Kazvid 
folder.  These videos, in turn, would have provided probable 
cause to obtain federal search warrants to search Stabile‘s five 
remaining hard drives for evidence of child pornography, 
including the illegally searched 40 GB hard drive.  
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This conclusion is supported by ―historical facts 
capable of ready verification, and not speculation.‖  Vasquez 
De Reyes, 149 F.3d at 195.  As previously discussed, the 
Government lawfully obtained the state search warrant, and 
execution of the state search warrant exposed lurid file names 
and at least one video of child pornography.  Thus, ―viewing 
affairs as they existed at the instant before the unlawful 
search,‖ Vasquez de Reyes, 149 F.3d at 195, the Government 
had probable cause to obtain a warrant to conduct a full 
search of the 120 GB hard drive.  In accordance with routine 
police procedures, the Government attempted to obtain the 
first federal search warrant before fully searching the 120 GB 
hard drive.  Moreover, the Government sought the second 
federal search warrant before embarking on a search of 
Stabile‘s five remaining hard drives.  As the District Court 
found, ―Albanese‘s application for the second federal search 
warrant [was] based on Agent Tokash‘s search of the 40 GB 
hard drive and the second federal search warrant issued based 
on probable cause supplied by the evidence discovered in 
Agent Tokash‘s search.‖  Appx. at A-107-08.  Although 
mistakes were made, proper execution of these routine 
procedures would have yielded evidence of child 
pornography.  Moreover, the very fact that the Government 
attempted to secure state and federal search warrants at every 
step of the search indicates that there would be little 
deterrence benefit in punishing the Government.  See Vasquez 
De Reyes, 149 F.3d at 195 (inevitable discovery doctrine 
―permits the court to balance the public interest in providing a 
jury with all relevant and probative evidence in a criminal 
proceeding against society‘s interest in deterring unlawful 
police conduct‖).  We conclude that the evidence obtained as 
a result of these illegal searches need not be suppressed 
because it inevitably would have been discovered.  
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III.B. Sentencing 
 Stabile also claims that his sentence is unreasonable.  
Because Stabile knowingly and voluntarily waived his right 
to appeal, and because nothing compels us to disregard this 
waiver, we decline to exercise our jurisdiction to review the 
merits of this claim.
24
  
 
Prior to sentencing, Stabile agreed to a set of ―non-jury 
trial stipulations,‖ which included a waiver of the right to 
―challenge [on appeal] the sentence imposed . . . if that 
sentence falls within or below the Guidelines range that 
results from the agreed total Guidelines offense level of 26.‖25  
Appx. at A-74.  Stabile was sentenced to 78 months‘ 
imprisonment, the bottom of the applicable Guidelines range.  
Moreover, our review of the record provides no indication 
that Stabile‘s waiver was anything less than knowing and 
voluntary.  Waivers of appellate rights, if entered into 
knowingly and voluntarily, are valid.  See United States v. 
Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001).   
 
Nonetheless, Stabile urges us to reach his claims by 
arguing that a constitutional concern and a procedural defect 
allegedly committed by the District Court amount to a 
                                              
24
 We review de novo whether Stabile waived his right to 
appeal his sentence.  Price, 558 F.3d at 277. 
 
25
 Stabile did not waive his right to appeal determination of 
his criminal history category, but he does not dispute this 
calculation. 
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miscarriage of justice.  In rare circumstances, we will exercise 
our jurisdiction irrespective of a waiver ―where an error 
amount[s] to a miscarriage of justice.‖  Khattak, 237 F.3d at 
562; see United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d 
Cir. 2007).  This exception ―will be applied sparingly and 
without undue generosity.‖  United States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 
455, 458 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Teeter, 257 
F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2001)).   
 
Stabile first argues that his sentence raises a 
―constitutional concern‖ because U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, as 
amended, imposes increased punishment on individuals who 
merely possess child pornography based on congressional 
concerns relating solely to offenders who actually engage in 
pedophilia.  Appx. at A-945-46. As acknowledged by the 
District Court, no evidence indicated that Stabile ever 
engaged in pedophilia.  He thus argues that his sentence, 
imposed pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, punishes him for acts 
for which he has never been convicted, contrary to the tenets 
of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).   Stabile 
additionally argues that the District Court should have 
departed from the child pornography Guidelines because they 
are neither the product of empirical research nor consistent 
with the Sentencing Commission‘s characteristic institutional 
role, as recently acknowledged by the Third Circuit in United 
States v. Grober, Nos. 09-1318 & 09-2120, 2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 21980, at *41-42 (3d Cir. Oct. 26, 2010).  
 
Neither of these claims compel us to set aside Stabile‘s 
waiver.  Even if preceding amendments to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 
were motivated by concerns pertaining specifically to acts of 
pedophilia rather than possession of child pornography alone, 
we do not believe this to be a sufficient reason to justify 
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disregarding Stabile‘s waiver.  See United States v. Lockett, 
406 F.3d 207, 212-14 (3d Cir. 2005) (upholding a valid 
waiver of appellate rights even in light of a subsequent 
holding by the Supreme Court that the pre-Booker regime 
under which appellant was sentenced was unconstitutional); 
United States v. Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(―[T]he right to appeal a sentence based on Apprendi/Booker 
grounds can be waived in a plea agreement.‖).  Moreover, 
while the District Court was entitled to depart from the child 
pornography Guidelines for the reasons cited by Stabile, 
neither Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) nor 
our recent decision in Grober, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 21980, 
required the District Court to take this course when 
sentencing Stabile.  Similarly, Stabile‘s reliance on United 
States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530 (3d Cir. 2009) is misplaced.  
In Olhovsky, the District Court made critical procedural errors 
and ignored expert testimony pertaining to the youthful 
offender‘s unique potential for rehabilitation – factors that are 
absent from the case before us.  Id. at 551. 
 
We similarly conclude that the procedural defects 
alleged by Stabile are insufficient to merit setting aside his 
appellate waiver.  Stabile argues that the District Court 
committed a procedural error by failing to sentence him at the 
higher end of the recommended Guidelines range in 
accordance with the Guidelines provision applicable to 
combined offenses.  U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4.  Stabile also contends 
that the District Court erred by failing to adequately explain 
its rejection of his arguments in favor of a non-Guidelines 
sentence.  Neither of these purported errors justify 
disregarding Stabile‘s waiver as we do not believe that they 
amount to a miscarriage of justice.  See United States v. 
Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 244 (3d Cir. 2008) (―[I]t will be a rare 
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and unusual situation when claims of an unreasonable 
sentence, standing alone, will be sufficient to invalidate a 
waiver because of a miscarriage of justice.‖).   
 
Because we conclude that the sentence imposed by the 
District Court does not amount to a miscarriage of justice, we 
will not set aside Stabile‘s waiver and reach the sentencing 
challenges he presents on appeal.   
 
IV. 
 We affirm the defendant‘s conviction and the District 
Court‘s denial of the motion to suppress.  Because we will 
enforce the appellate waiver, we dismiss this sentencing 
appeal and thereby affirm the defendant‘s sentence. 
